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1 Introduction 
Bank distress may lead to important real effects. Shocks to bank liquidity or 
impairments of bank balance sheets translate into the real economy if firms cannot 
easily turn to alternative sources of financing. An unanswered question is how bank 
distress impacts on firms’ probability of default (PD), and firms’ availability of 
alternative sources of finance such as trade credit. We identify bank distress with a 
capital injection from a bank rescue scheme. Here, restructuring and deleveraging 
requirements imposed by the bank rescue schemes curb bailed-out banks’ risk taking 
and lending activities (see Berger et al., 2016). Using data from an independent credit 
rating agency, we investigate whether bank distress (i.e., bailout) impacts this agency’s 
assessment of a firm’s probability of default, and its advised maximum trade-credit 
amount to a firm.  
The impact of bank distress may not transmit homogeneously across firms, bank 
business models, and periods. Relationship-oriented banks, for example, help in 
smoothing out credit constraints that firms face (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger 
and Udell, 2002; Bolton et al. 2016; Beck et al. 2018). We therefore examine how bank 
distress transmits to firms with different default probabilities, and whether relationship 
banks mitigate the potential adverse effects for firms. In addition, we investigate 
whether the impacts in an idiosyncratic bank distress event are different from the ones 
in times of a systemic banking crisis featuring different transmission of bank distress 
shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. Finally, we analyze whether bank 
distress has an impact on firm real outcomes as measured by its sales. 
It is important to make clear upfront that bank distress in our sample stems from sources 
unrelated to small firms’ credit risk. Our distressed bank sample contains regional 
private banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks. The triggers for bank distress are 
related to problems with these banks’ mortgage portfolio, the unexpected default of a 
single but large exposure, or structural problems with regard to specific business 
models. 
We apply recent methods used in the literature on the transmission of shocks to identify 
a bank risk channel.1 Banks affect firm risk through several factors, such as whether 
credit is granted or not, the loan amount, other loan conditions, or the general quality 
and extent of services provided. We classify supply-related factors affecting firm risk as 
                                                 
1 There is a big literature that focuses on credit supply shocks which is typically referred to as the bank 
lending channel (e.g., Gambacorta, 2005; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Nilsen, 
2002). 
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the bank risk channel. We aim to control for what we call the firm risk channel, which 
captures demand-related factors affecting firm risk such as a firm’s industry, location, 
size, general economic conditions, and the institutional environment the firm faces. To 
separate the bank risk channel and the firm risk channel, we apply the methods 
employed to disentangle supply and demand for loans (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2008; 
Morais, Peydró, and Ruiz, 2016; and Degryse et al., 2019) to a setting of risk 
transmission in bank-firm relationships. Specifically, we apply a clustering method 
similar to Degryse et al. (2019). In the environment of firms’ PDs, this will make it 
possible to cancel out time, industry, regional, age and firm size effects on PDs that 
arise in the economy. In this way, we aim to identify the “bank-induced” impact of bank 
distress on the PDs of firms. 
We also study whether the bank risk channel following bank distress differs depending 
upon whether bank distress is idiosyncratic or systemic in nature. In particular, we 
investigate whether the 2008-2009 banking crisis had different effects that go beyond 
the usual adjustments when banks are distressed. In times of financial crisis, banks may 
find it necessary (or be mandated by the regulator) to change their lending policy and 
make their loan decisions less opaque. This change might go beyond adjustments in 
loan characteristics, such as interest rates and collateral requirements but constitute a 
structural change in both the bank’s lending policy and the transmission of bank distress 
shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets.2 As the impact of banks’ strategies 
might differ in normal times from a time when a systemic crisis exists (Degryse et al., 
2015; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), we also differentiate between normal times and 
times of crisis in the analysis. 
We combine several unique datasets to tackle these questions. First, we employ the 
Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP)3 which covers, for almost any German non-
financial entity, an individual credit rating, its bank-firm relationships and other firm-
specific information between 1999 and 2013. Second, we use regulatory and bank 
balance sheet data from the Deutsche Bundesbank. We combine the Bundesbank data 
with the MUP information on bank names in order to identify banks in distress. Third, 
we obtain information from MUP, such as banks’ regional or industry-specific market 
and portfolio shares, default rates in corporate banking, and relationship orientation 
measures. 
                                                 
2 In contrast, banks in distress may relax their credit standards, provide soft loan terms, and in this way 
evergreen the more risky borrowers in a bid to reduce potential losses on them (Peek and Rosengren, 
1997) or comply with local political guidelines (Gropp et al., 2010).   
3 The Mannheim Enterprise Panel (“Mannheimer Unternehmenspanel”, MUP) of the ZEW Leibnitz 
Centre for European Economic Research is the most comprehensive micro database for companies in 
Germany outside the official business register (which is not accessible to the general public). 
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Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, distress-induced bank bailouts lead to 
important increases in firms’ expected probability of default as evaluated by the credit 
rating agency. In particular, firms borrowing from a bailed out bank see their probability 
of default increase with about 10% relative to similar firms borrowing from other banks. 
This effect is mainly driven by bailouts of transaction banks. Second, bailouts generate 
multiplier effects towards potential other sources of credit: the credit rating agency 
reduces its advisory trade credit limit to firms borrowing from bailed out banks with 
about 11% relative to similar firms that are engaging unaffected banks. This effect 
mainly stems from crisis times. We also find that a firm’s actual sales drop with about 
8% after bank bailout. 
Our work mostly builds on the stream of literature dealing with the transmission of 
shocks from the financial industry into the real economy (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 
1997; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Nilsen, 2002; Gambacorta, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 
2008; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009, Santos, 2010; Puri et 
al., 2011; Jiménez et al., 2012; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012a and 2012b, Chodorow-
Reich, 2014; Allen et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2018). The literature shows that banks 
facing liquidity or credit constraints grant less credit and transmit shocks to the real 
economy. A part of this literature deals with the question whether bank rescue measures 
in financial crises (in particular TARP bailouts) help to mitigate the real consequences 
of crises (e.g., Berger and Roman, 2017 and Berger et al, 2017). The evidence suggests 
that banks bailouts programs improved credit supply.   
A second stream of literature relevant to our work is the literature on relationship 
banking and financial intermediation between firms and banks over the business cycle 
(e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Bolton et al., 2016; 
Degryse et al., 2015; Beck et al., 2018). Our paper contributes to these two strands of 
the literature. We study how bank distress affects the firms’ PDs as perceived by an 
external credit rating agency, trade credit availability and firm sales. Moreover, we 
identify the role of banks’ business models in this transmission process. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of bank bailout schemes in Germany. Section 3 introduces our data. 
Section 4 presents the method of nearest neighbor matching as well as the outcome of 
the matching process. Section 5 describes our methodology for the regression analysis. 
In Section 6, the results for our research question are shown and discussed. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2 Bank Bailout Schemes in Germany 
Bank distress is usually identified by various rescue measures taken by supervisors or 
protection schemes operated by bankers associations (see, for example, Kick and Prieto, 
2013; Bian et al., 2016; Kick et al., 2016). Typical rescue measures are capital support 
(i.e., capital injections and guarantees) as well as distressed mergers (which are often 
the last resort after previous capital support measures have failed). In the last few 
decades most bank bailouts in Germany have been privately organized by bankers 
associations, often with internal auditors in place to monitor member banks. In the wake 
of the global financial crisis, however, an additional rescue scheme was established by 
the government as the private schemes were not sufficient any more. 
2.1 Organization of Bank Recovery and Resolution in Germany 
There are privately organized and government-funded bank rescue schemes in 
Germany, if necessary accompanied by interventions by supervisors. 
i) Privately organized insurance funds of the German banking system 
The German banking system contains three banking pillars (i.e., commercial banks, 
savings banks, and cooperative banks). Each banking pillar has a voluntary financed 
insurance fund operated by the respective bankers’ association that may provide capital 
support if a bank within the pillar is in distress. While supervisors4 may be consulted 
during the process, the final decision on granting capital support rests with the 
respective protection scheme. The protection scheme and the member bank sign a 
contract which includes the specific shortcomings of the troubled bank that need to be 
addressed and plans on how to resolve the distress. The protection scheme usually gains 
far-reaching control rights if the member bank becomes distressed, and is generally 
accompanied by restructuring and deleveraging orders.5 
If capital support measures are still considered insufficient (maybe if the distressed bank 
has reached a stage where recovery is no longer possible) bankers’ associations have the 
power to order restructuring mergers (also called distressed mergers) in the course of 
the resolution process. That is, bank managers have very few incentives for their 
institution to be regarded as distressed. Therefore, they will apply for capital support 
measures only if they deem this absolutely necessary to fulfill supervisory minimum 
                                                 
4 The responsible supervisors in Germany are the European Central Bank, the German federal financial 
supervisory authority (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht”, BaFin) and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
5 Bian et al. (2016), for example, find for German savings banks that restructuring activities are 
significantly greater in a bailout by the bankers’ association than when the bailout is undertaken by 
politicians. 
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capital requirements. On the other hand, for the respective bankers’ associations it is an 
inherent part of having an impeccable reputation that their member institutions are 
“safe”, and that the respective stakeholders are able to trust in the respective protection 
scheme even in times of crisis. 
ii) Government-funded recovery and resolution schemes 
At the end of 2008, as a response to the financial and economic crisis, the Financial 
Market Stabilization Fund (“Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung", SoFFin) was 
established which supplements the described voluntary measures of the banking 
industry. Even though SoFFin support has been granted to only a small number of major 
German banks, such government bailout measures have been large in volume (see Kick 
and Koetter, 2016). SoFFin support also went along with far-reaching restrictions (e.g., 
compensation restrictions for executive board members) and control rights for the 
German government. In addition, some Landesbanks received capital injections from 
their owners (the respective state governments). 
iii) Interventions by supervisors 
In addition, if supervisors deem the described measures inadequate or insufficient, they 
can also intervene pursuant to the German Banking Act (“Kreditwesengesetz”, KWG). 
This includes severe interventions such as moratoria or finally revoking the bank’s 
charter. The bankers associations’ and the supervisors’ decisions are not independent of 
each other, with various decision-makers being involved (European Central Bank, 
BaFin, Bundesbank, bankers associations and the boards of the protection schemes). 
Even though the bailout process appears to be opaque, the interventions of the various 
stakeholders complement each other and constitute a kind of well-functioning “private-
public partnership” (for a detailed description of the protection schemes in the German 
banking sector, see also Kick et al., 2016). 
2.2 Cost-benefit Considerations 
In Germany, only a few (mostly small) private banks have actually defaulted. Troubled 
savings banks, Landesbanks and cooperative banks have been resolved by means of 
capital support measures or restructuring mergers – in a few cases including the 
establishment of a “bad bank”. In general, distressed banks were first provided with 
capital support measures, and hence the chance for recovery; the weakest banks, 
however, finally left the market mostly by means of distressed mergers (see Kick et al., 
2016). The unresolved default of financial institutions would cause losses for 
stakeholders (investors, staff, depositors, etc.), but also serious reputational damage for 
the respective banking pillars (and their bankers associations) as well as for the German 
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banking market as a whole (bank runs, credit crunch in the interbank markets, etc.). In 
addition, in some cases also the owners of troubled banks took measures (e.g. capital 
increases, restructuring measures and mergers) to resolve bank distress. 
A prominent rescue scheme in the US was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
which was established in 2008. As in Germany, distressed banks were rescued by 
capital injections. The first nine banks were forced to participate in the program whereas 
the later ones were voluntary and had to apply for TARP funds (Berger, 2018). 
Approval to obtain TARP funds took then into account a bank’s financial health with 
“healthy viable” ones being more likely to receive capital. TARP recipients were 
subject to compensation restrictions. 
Compensation restrictions are also common in the different German rescue schemes. In 
addition, distressed banks obtaining capital support from private schemes in Germany 
are subject to substantial restructuring and deleveraging requirements. Moreover, the 
German system and TARP also differ with respect to the source providing capital. 
TARP was organized by the US Treasury whereas in most bailouts in Germany capital 
stems from the bankers associations. 
2.3 Effects on the Real Economy 
While the bank recovery and resolution schemes in Germany generate huge benefits 
through a stable and creditable financial system, our paper studies whether there is also 
some curbing effect on the real economy which goes along with restrictions from the 
bailout process. Distressed banks requiring capital support measures (and/or a 
restructuring merger as ultima ratio) are subject to restructuring and deleveraging 
conditions6 which may cause a credit crunch in particular for their corporate clients. 
Following this line of argument, we investigate to which extent restrictions in the course 
of the bank bailout process are likely also to facilitate the actual default of firms in their 
credit portfolio, or contribute to a weakening of their creditworthiness (via increase of 
firms’ probabilities of default, or a lowering of their maximum trade credit 
recommendation), and what the negative effects on these firms’ sales are. Here, we 
confirm that a strong banking relationship can be beneficial to shield a firm from the 
credit crunch caused by bank distress. Moreover, the process helps to remove the 
weakest and most risky firms from the market (i.e., distressed banks were no longer able 
to pursue a strategy to keep inefficient contracts on the balance sheet). 
                                                 
6 Note that the distressed bank agrees on restructuring and deleveraging conditions in order to receive 
capital support. Both privately organized and government-funded insurance schemes and also supervisors 
will strictly curb the activities of bailed out banks in case they do not adjust their business model, or 
misuse the capital support to maintain excessive risk taking. 
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3 Data 
3.1 Firm Data 
For firm data, we use the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP), a panel dataset generated 
by the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research. This contains the 
complete data pool of Creditreform e.V. (on a half-yearly basis), the largest credit rating 
agency in Germany. The MUP is the most comprehensive micro database of companies 
in Germany next to the official Business Register of the Federal Statistical Office 
(where the Register of the Federal Statistical Office is not accessible to the general 
public). Comparisons of MUP with the official Business Register reveal that the 
coverage of MUP represents nearly the universe of firms in Germany. It therefore 
provides a representative picture of the corporate landscape in Germany. For detailed 
information about data collection, processing and definitions, see Bersch et al. (2014). 
The MUP contains a large number of firm characteristics. It includes firm size (annual 
sales, number of employed persons), industry (five-digit industry sector code according 
to NACE rev. 2), legal form, date of foundation and closure, the company’s complete 
address, shareholder structure and personal details about the involved persons. More 
importantly for our analysis, the data also includes Creditreform’s credit rating score 
and information on the firms’ banking relationships. The credit rating score is an index 
ranging from 100 to 600, showing the firm’s credit rating for each panel year. The credit 
rating is finally translated into PDs. 
The most important drivers of the Creditreform rating are a firm’s payment behavior, 
the Creditreform credit opinion as well as company development, industry and order 
situation. Furthermore, also information from financial reporting (i.e., balance sheet 
data), regional risk, managerial experience and performance indicators such as sales and 
capital enter the calculation of the score. Information about a firm’s banking 
relationship most likely enters the component “credit opinion” making up to 25% of the 
index weight. While Creditreform leaves this component of their credit rating rather 
vague, it is reasonable to assume that qualitative information is used, such as whether 
banks tightened lending requirements, asked for more collateral, or did not extend credit 
lines. Furthermore, other components of the Creditreform rating such as payment 
behavior, company development and order situation will also directly or indirectly be 
influenced by bank behavior (e.g., if a bank tightens its lending requirements). The 
credit score has already been used in a number of recent papers (Brown et al., 2012; 
Cremers and Schliessler, 2014; Hoewer, 2016). 
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The dataset includes up to six banking relationships of a given company. The first 
relationship is denoted as the main bank (“Hausbank“), i.e., the bank used for day-to-
day transactions, credit lines, and which is most likely to be the firm’s main lender. Our 
analyses rely on the firm’s main bank relationship, as it constitutes the prominent 
external financier for the firm. 
3.2 Bank Data 
We employ several data sources for information on banks. First, we use the ZEW 
Bankpanel combined with Creditreform data aggregated at the bank level. The 
Creditreform dataset contains the identity of the bank’s branch employed by the 
company. The bank branches themselves are linked to the overall bank by the unique 
German bank identifier BLZ. Using this link, ZEW constructs a panel of all banks 
operating in Germany. By aggregating information on all firms connected to a particular 
bank, we obtain banks’ market shares or portfolio shares by region and industry. 
Moreover, we are able to derive rates of firm failures by bank that go beyond 
information provided in banks’ balance sheets.7 A detailed description of the variables 
is given in Table 8 in the Appendix. 
Second, we employ bank data from Bundesbank’s prudential database BAKIS and the 
Borrowers’ Statistics (“Kreditnehmerstatistik”). BAKIS contains information on banks’ 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. Moreover, it includes the results of the 
quantitative audit reports which show confidential information on the quality of bank’s 
loan portfolio. The data is used mainly for supervisory monitoring, but in several 
instances also for research (for a general description of BAKIS, see Memmel and Stein, 
2008). In addition, we use the Borrowers Statistics to derive the industry structure of 
banks’ loan portfolios. 
Third, we employ information on extremely weak banks from Bundesbank’s Bank 
Distress Database. For our research design we identify distressed banks as banks 
receiving an initial capital injection from privately or government funded rescue 
schemes (more details are provided in Section 2). This measure constitutes a unique 
event for the bank. 
                                                 
7 The individual relationship entering a bank’s portfolio may be weighted by its rank (main bank or not) 
as well as its PD or its number of employees. 
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4 Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
4.1 Empirical Methodology 
Our firm-level dataset contains information on the individual bank-firm relationship 
over the period 2000 to 2012. We focus on the main bank relationships. To investigate 
the treatment of bank distress on firms’ outcomes (in particular, their PDs), only a 
selected sample of firms will be employed. The reason for this is that not all banks (and, 
in turn, their firms) are equally likely to receive such treatment. 
We use nearest-neighbor matching of banks in order to find an appropriate control 
group of banks which would have had a similar likelihood of receiving an initial capital 
injection (treatment), but which did not receive one. Our method has to be distinguished 
from a standard matching approach, where the matching serves both to alleviate the bias 
of selection into treatment and to construct an adequate control group. In our setting, the 
problem of selection into treatment plays a subordinate role, as the treatment (i.e., 
capital injection to bank) may be assumed to be exogenous to an individual firm’s 
performance in our sample. 
First, most firms in our sample are small: 90% have fewer than 50 employees; the 
median firm has around six employees. We further exclude firms with more than 10,000 
employees to reduce reverse causality as the unexpected default of such a single but 
large exposure could induce bank default. Second, there may be regional demand 
shocks which affect many firms in a single region at the same time, thereby triggering a 
bank default. We control for such regional shocks both by the matching of banks (the 
same macroeconomic environment is a precondition, see below) and in the firm-level 
regression by using “group” fixed effects in the estimation to compare firms within a 
group that are likely subject to the same demand shocks. Finally, neither banks nor the 
bankers’ association’s protection schemes announce capital injections. Given that we 
apply matching on bank performance covariates right before the treatment occurs, the 
treatment should not be foreseeable for customer-firms ex ante. 
In our sample, the main channels for bank distress are related to problems with banks’ 
mortgage portfolio, the unexpected default of a single but large exposure, or structural 
problems with regard to specific business models. 
We carry out the matching to obtain an appropriate control group of banks that can be 
traced over the same time span and has a similar likelihood of receiving treatment. 
Therefore, we conduct the matching at the bank level and only later enrich the sample of 
nearest neighbors with firm data. 
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We match the treated banks (i.e., banks with a capital injection) with control banks at 
period t-1, i.e., one year before the initial capital support measure is conducted. We 
match with control banks that are not treated either in that year or in any of the three 
subsequent years following the treatment (including the treatment year). The matching 
yields at least one control bank for every treated bank. In order to obtain more 
observations for the firm-level analysis in the second step, we allow for up to three 
nearest neighbors. We trace the neighbors throughout the sample time span and link 
them to the firms having firm-bank relationships to these banks. 
One challenging feature of the German banking market consists in the numerous bank 
mergers in almost any banking segment. The number of banks fell from approximately 
4,300 banks in 1990 to 2,700 in 2000, and 2,000 banks in 2010. Mergers are often a 
means of restructuring a bank and preventing it from defaulting. Therefore, initial 
capital support occurs more frequently before a merger than it does in a situation where 
no merger takes places. From an econometric point of view, mergers are difficult to deal 
with for two major reasons. First, they are a second treatment which is not independent 
of the first treatment. Second, the merger makes it substantially more difficult to 
conduct a control group study, because the bank prior to the merger will be substantially 
different from the one afterwards (e.g., with respect to size, regional focus). 
There are two ways to handle these problems in the analysis. One way is to introduce a 
differentiated analysis by type of treatment, i.e., whether only treatment 1 (capital 
support) takes place or treatment 1 is accompanied or followed by treatment 2 (the 
merger). The latter case will then be a different treatment effect that is estimated. 
Another way is to look only at treatment 1 and condition on a sufficient (e.g., three-
year) time span before treatment 2 takes place. We would then be looking only at a 
maximum window of -3 to +3 years (including the treatment year) before and after 
treatment 1. Such a methodology yields a valid estimation framework for a control 
group setting, since the treated bank is still structurally the same. As a matter of fact, it 
has to be stated that this choice also limits the scope of our analysis because we cannot 
analyze cases where both treatment 1 and 2 occur. 
We apply method 2 in our analysis. The sample of treated banks is therefore restricted 
to banks existing at least three years before and three years after the treatment as the 
same unit.8 As we want to follow firms in a window -3 to +2, treatments before 2003 
are not taken into account, nor are treatments taking place after 2010. 
                                                 
8 We restrict our sample in the firm-level regression to firms that did not switch banks in these 6 years in 
order to avoid biases by entering or exiting customers. Main bank switching is very rare with annual 
switching rates of about 1.3% only. 
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In order to find the nearest neighbors, we use observables based on the CAMEL-rating 
components in the year just before the treatment. To use the components generating the 
CAMEL rating is a plausible way of identifying distressed banks as also deposit 
insurance and supervisory authorities like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) or the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) use such ratings in order 
to conduct their bank examinations. Apart from a variety of observable characteristics 
of banks, we postulate the following fixed matching criteria: 
1. Treatment and control observation are in the same year. 
2. Treatment and control bank are localized in the same region.9 
3. At the year of evaluation, both matched banks have at least three years of 
observations before and after the matched point in time. 
4. Treatment and control bank are of the same type (commercial bank, savings bank, 
cooperative bank). 
The first and second restrictions guarantee that treatment and control bank face the same 
(regional) macroeconomic conditions. The third restriction leaves us with those banks 
that can be traced over a sufficient time span. Condition four accounts for the fact that 
most of the capital injections stem from protection schemes, separately organized and 
operated by bankers’ associations of the three banking pillars. Condition 2 also helps to 
comply with supervision based on the level of the respective region and also 
corresponds to the fact that the Eastern German banking sector has developed 
differently from the Western. In the matching equation, the dependent variable is 
“affected bank” which takes the value of 1 if a bank receives an initial capital injection 
in period t+1. The explanatory variables corresponding to the CAMEL-rating 
components are described in Table 8 in the Appendix. 
4.2 Results 
Table 1 shows the output of the matching regression. As expected, the NPL Ratio 
increases the probability of receiving a capital injection. Moreover, better capitalized 
banks (as measured by the Reserves Ratio) are less likely to receive a capital injection. 
Other variables are not statistically significant. 
For each bank, the matching regression yields a propensity score for receiving an initial 
capital injection in period t+1, given the characteristics of period t. The propensity score 
is scaled by bank type, the region of the headquarters, as well as the year of observation. 
With the resulting scaled propensity score, we perform nearest neighbor matching. 
                                                 
9 Measured by Eastern and Western Germany. 
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Table 1: Matching Regression 
Method Logit 
Dependent Variable Affected bank (Bank Receives Initial Capital 
Injection in Period t+1) 
Bank Size 0.265 
  (0.187) 
Bank Customers 0.131 
  (0.171) 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -0.155 
  (0.109) 
Reserves Ratio -1.088*** 
  (0.271) 
NPL Ratio 0.064** 
  (0.031) 
Loan Portfolio HHI 0.006 
  (0.015) 
OBS Ratio -0.004 
  (0.026) 
Share of Customer Loans -0.003 
  (0.012) 
LLP Ratio 0.354 
  (0.309) 
CIR 0.001 
  (0.006) 
RoE  -0.008 
  (0.008) 
Cash Holdings Ratio 0.074 
  (0.093) 
Share of Distressed Customers -7.775 
  (9.701) 
Constant -10.280*** 
  (3.980) 
Observations 5,815 
Pseudo R-squared 0.207 
Controls Bank Type, Year and Region 
The table shows the logit regression results used to calculate the propensity score for the matching. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are explained in Table 8 in 
the Appendix. 
Table 2 shows information on the propensity score matching by year of treatment. We 
obtain a sample of 93 banks, of which 25 banks receive a capital injection. The 
remaining 68 banks are control banks, i.e. they are in distress, but do not receive a 
capital injection. For each of the 25 treated banks, we have at least one and up to three 
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control banks.10 The number of distress events varies considerably across years. Most 
events occur in 2003, 2005 and in the period from 2007 to 2009. Hence, most of the 
distress events in our sample occurred before the onset of the global financial and 
economic crisis. As we do not have matches for 2010, we only use firm level data from 
2000 to 2011. 
Table 2: Number of Treated Banks and Control Banks 
Treatment Year 
Treated Banks          
(banks with a capital 
injection) 
Control Banks          
(banks without a 
capital injection) 
Total 
2003 8 19 27 
2004 2 6 8 
2005 4 10 14 
2006 1 3 4 
2007 3 9 12 
2008 4 12 16 
2009 8 9 27 
Total 25 68 93 
For each treated bank up to three control banks are selected. Each bank is observed for a total of six 
years around the treatment year. The full sample period covers 2000 to 2011. 
By comparing characteristics of treated and control banks we obtain a picture of the 
quality of our matching and how relevant the treatment is. Figure 1 shows mean bank 
covariates before and after the treatment for both treatment and control banks. Up to the 
matching (t-1), most characteristics of treated and control banks evolved in a similar 
way and reached comparable levels at t-1 (time of matching). While both types of banks 
are rather small (total assets of below 5 billion Euros), the average treated bank is 
somewhat larger. 
After the treatment, the NPL Ratio increases for treated banks (in particular, two years 
after the capital injection), while it stays rather flat for control banks. This may reflect a 
tendency of distressed banks receiving a capital injection to clean up their balance sheet 
after a while. This interpretation is in line with the finding that the Share of Distressed 
Customers develops in a rather similar way for treated and control banks. 
Moreover, treated banks decrease assets more than non-treated banks do, while they 
increase their off-balance sheet activities. Banks that receive a capital injection are put 
under pressure to restructure by the responsible deposit insurance fund and/or 
supervisors. They may have to shrink balance sheets in order to be able to pay back the 
capital injection. The Tier 1 Capital Ratio of treated banks improves after matching, 
                                                 
10 A bank may serve as a control bank more than once within the sample. Treated banks are not used as 
control banks at another time.   
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mainly driven by the decrease in assets and the capital injections treated banks receive. 
For non-treated banks, the capital ratio stays almost constant. 
Profitability and cost-efficiency of treated and control banks also develop very 
differently after the matching. The RoE of treated banks decreases sharply and improves 
again only two years after the capital injection. The profitability of control banks, 
however, increases immediately after the matching. Restructurings often lead (at least 
temporarily) to higher costs and lower profits. Two years after the capital injection, RoE 
of treated banks is still lower than that of control banks. This finding suggests that 
treated banks face very difficult conditions after the capital injection. In the same line of 
argument, cost-efficiency of treated banks, as measured by the CIR, reduces drastically 
after the treatment such that by year 2 after treatment, on average 80% of income is 
eaten up by costs. The likely cause of this is two-sided as both earnings drop and costs 
will rise through organizational restructuring. 
To conclude, Figure 1 in the Appendix shows that bank characteristics of treated and 
control banks evolve similarly in terms of trends and levels before the treatment. After 
the treatment, treated banks seem to face very difficult conditions, which should have 
significant effects on their customer portfolio. 
5 Regression Analysis 
5.1 Data and Empirical Methodology 
5.1.1 Data 
To construct our firm-level dataset, we use the above sample of matched banks and 
connect the banks to all firms which use the respective bank as their main bank. We 
obtain a sample of about 70,000 individual firms, leading to about 285,000 observations 
over the total sample period. 
Table 3 shows the size of the compound sample by year of observation and year of 
treatment. Some firms may occur multiple times within the sample because two 
different treated banks may have the same control bank. We introduce the variable 
Neighbor which captures the identifier of the current matched control bank (there may 
be up to three bank neighbors). The dataset is therefore uniquely defined at the firm-
bank neighbor-year level. 
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Table 3: Firm-Observations by Year of Observation (“Left”) and Year of 
Treatment (“Top”) 
Year of 
Observation 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
2000 7,013 7,013 
2001 7,109 1,993 9,102 
2002 7,102 2,005 3,555 12,662 
2003 7,216 2,117 3,697 1,066 14,096 
2004 7,208 2,110 3,825 1,113 6,132 20,488 
2005 7,159 2,283 3,835 1,111 5,920 2,247 22,555 
2006 2,281 4,069 1,429 5,817 2,474 24,619 40,689 
2007 4,092 1,423 5,739 2,792 24,963 39,009 
2008 1,402 5,710 3,134 24,805 35,051 
2009 5,616 3,532 24,478 33,626 
2010 3,862 24,008 27,870 
2011 22,929 22,929 
Total 42,807 12,889 23,073 7,544 34,934 18,041 145,802 285,090 
Firms may occur multiple times because two treated banks may have the same control bank. The 
dataset is uniquely defined at the firm-bank-neighbor-year-level. 
Table 4 compares characteristics of firms at treated and non-treated banks in the year 
before the treatment. Both groups of firms are, on average, young (about 20 years) and 
very small (about €3 million in sales). Most firms have a close relationship with their 
main bank, as indicated by the small number of bank relationships. Variables are 
defined in Table 9 in the Appendix. 
Table 4: Comparison of Firms of Treated and Control Banks 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean (year before 
treatment) 
Mean 
Difference 
Variables Treated Control Treated Control 
Firm PD 11,890 35,679 9.5% 11.2% -0.0169*** 
Firm Age 11,890 35,679 21.9 21.3 0.6242 
Employees 8,412 26,320 8.3 11.5 -3.1968 
Firm Sales 8,372 25,212 2877.1 2957.2 -80.15 
Bank Relationships 11,890 35,679 1.1 1.4 -0.0025 
Actual Firm Default 10,758 31,475 8.9% 11.0% -0.0206*** 
Single Relationship 11,890 35,679 74.0% 79.1% -0.0509*** 
Firm MaxLoan 10,392 30,253 14.5 14.3 0.169 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For a definition of firm variables see Table 9 in 
the Appendix. 
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5.1.2 Model 
In order to capture the bank-induced effect on firm distress (i.e., supply effect), we 
control for firm-specific demand effects. Ideally, we would include firm-fixed effects, 
as in Khwaja and Mian, 2008, for example. In our setting this is not possible, as we 
focus on the firm’s main bank relationship. We therefore follow recent literature and 
replace the firm-fixed effects by a grouping of firm observations where firms in one 
group face the same legal, macroeconomic, spatial, and industrial environment (e.g., 
Degryse et al., 2019; Morais et al., 2016). These papers show that controlling for firm 
demand in this way hardly affects the estimated supply effects. 
We apply a grouping at the level of industry-region-size class-age class-Creditreform 
division-matched banks-year.11 The highly granular grouping should capture firms’ 
fundamental risk adequately. In particular, there should not be a correlation between 
fundamental firm-risk and the treatment within these groups which is the identifying 
assumption that we rely on. The grouping enables us to capture “demand-side” or 
macroeconomic effects that may influence firms’ PDs but do not influence firms’ 
fundamental risk. According to Creditreform, factors such as the individual market 
segment influence the PDs. Our group-fixed effect aims to net out such effects from the 
estimation. 
We further control for potential differences related to the organization of the credit 
rating agency. Creditreform is organized in 130 divisions across Germany. Each 
division is identified as part of the firm ID. We control for a combination of division 
and year because risk assessment may slightly differ across divisions. Furthermore, the 
rating methodology undergoes some regular revisions, which might be implemented at 
different points in time by each division. Therefore, we include division-year fixed 
effects. 
Due to our matching, we have an adequate control group at the bank-level in our 
regression. Therefore, we do not need to include any other bank-related characteristics 
for identification of the treatment effect. Robustness checks in Section 6.4 show that our 
results remain unaffected if we include various bank covariates. The same holds if we 
include more firm characteristics. 
Our methodology combines a conditional difference-in-differences approach with a 
fixed effects approach. We want to estimate the impact of bank distress on firm distress 
                                                 
11 For industry-classification see Table 11; for legal forms see Table 10. We divide firms into seven size 
classes (sole proprietor, 2-5, 6-14, 15-48, 50-99, 100-249, 250+), see Table 12, four age classes (younger 
than 8, 8-15, 16-25, 26+), see Table 13. Regions are the 16 German states (“Bundeslaender”), see Table 
14. 
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and performance indicators. Like in any difference-in-differences setup, we need (in 
addition to an intercept on the right-hand side), (i) the treatment dummy (affected bank), 
(ii) the indicator for after-treatment periods (post) and (iii) the interaction of both in 
order to represent our four states of the world. This interaction term shows the treatment 
effect, i.e. in our case how, for example, the PD of firms connected to banks in distress 
and bailed out evolves compared to the average PD of firms connected to banks not 
bailed out. Our final model therefore is specified as 
݂݅ݎ݉	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚ௣௢௦௧ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ௜௞,௧ + 	ߚ௔௙௙௘௖௧௘ௗ ∗ ݂݂ܽ݁ܿݐ݁݀௜௞,௧ (1) 
+ߚ஺்ா் ∗ ݂݂ܽ݁ܿݐ݁݀௜௞,௧ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ௜௞,௧ + 	ߩ௚௞,௧ + ߝ௜௚௞,௧ 
 
i: firm, k: bank, g: group, t: time 
Firm outcome may be, in terms of distress, a firm’s probability of default (Firm PD), 
the actual default of a firm (Actual Firm Default), the maximum trade credit 
recommendation for a firm in log (Log (Firm MaxLoan)) and, in terms of performance, 
the log value of sales a firm realizes in their P&L account (Firm Sales). Further, 
݌݋ݏݐ௜௞,௧ takes the value of 1 if firm i has a relationship with bank k in period t, where 
period t is either the treatment year or the period after the treatment year. The indicator 
݂݂ܽ݁ܿݐ݁݀௜௞,௧ takes the value of 1 if firm i has a relationship with bank k in period t, 
where bank k is a treated bank. Much the same holds for the interaction of both. 
ߩ௚௞,௧ is a group fixed-effect consisting of: industry-region-size class-age class-
Creditreform division-matched banks-year. The group effect ߩ௚௞,௧ serves to absorb 
demand side and business cycle effects associated to each group of firms that may 
influence firms’ outcomes. Our assumption to identify the “bank-induced” effects 
(ߚ஺்ா்) is that we can control for demand shocks. Degryse et al. (2019) have shown that 
industry-size-location group fixed effects may serve as reasonable demand controls 
whenever firm-time fixed effects cannot be included. We further coarsen the groups to 
control for the Creditreform division to account for heterogeneous risk assessment 
methods across different Creditreform divisions and/or time. Finally, the group effects 
also contain an indicator for the set of matched banks, which allows identifying the 
treatment effect within the matched bank neighbor(s). We drop the i, k and t subscripts 
for the components of ߩ௚௞,௧ as they always refer to a specific combination of i, k and t. 
While we interpret the estimated ߚ஺்ா் as bank-induced, we acknowledge that this 
needs be interpreted with care as this is based upon our assumption that our firm-
grouping absorbs demand shocks. 
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5.2 Model Estimation 
In order to estimate our model we choose a population-average GLM-estimator, also 
referred to as a generalized estimating equation (GEE). The GEE framework is often 
used in settings where the covariance structure of residuals is unknown. As GEE 
estimators are population-average models, they focus on the average effect over an 
unspecified population of individuals. They are frequently used to estimate average 
responses in clustered samples. Our setting with 130 different clubs evaluating the PD 
of firms seems to be of exactly this kind. We do not know the covariance structure 
within the clusters, but are still able to obtain consistent estimates even if the covariance 
structure is misspecified. The estimator is similar to a random effects (RE) Tobit 
regression with a Gaussian random effect.12 
Other than in a genuine fixed or random effects setting, we do not take our firm 
identifier as a panel variable and neither year as our time variable. Instead, a group 
identifier is our panel variable. Note that the timing of the observation (year) is part of 
the panel variable. The theoretical time variable is constituted by the individual firm-
year observations that are part of group g in year t. We bundle the group identifier in a 
fixed effect ߩ௚௞,௧	ෟ  where we assume exchangeable correlation structure of residuals 
within each group. This structure is a reasonable assumption, since groups are narrowly 
defined and, in particular, are constituted within each division unit. 
Our final dataset consists of about 285,000 observations representing about 70,000 
individual firms, each over a period of up to six years. We follow firms in our matched 
sample three years before the treatment, in the treatment period, and two years after it. 
There are a couple of reasons to do so. First, we choose a short period of time after 
treatment in order to capture the direct impact of the treatment and to make sure that our 
measurement is less likely to be contaminated by other influences. Second, there are 
substantial dynamics in firms’ outcomes, at least in their annual PDs. Hence, the longer 
the time window the more of these yearly movements will overlay each other and keep 
us from obtaining a valid estimate of the treatment effect. 
6 Empirical Results 
This section presents results for our conditional difference-in-differences estimations of 
bank risk and bailout on firm outcomes. Outcome variables are firm probability of 
default (Firm PD), actual default of a firm (Actual Firm Default), maximum trade credit 
                                                 
12 Note that robustness checks in Section 6.4 show that our results are confirmed using OLS, RE or Tobit 
regressions. 
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recommendation (Firm MaxLoan, in log), and sales from the P&L account (Firm Sales, 
in log). Robustness checks are presented in Section 6.4 where we verify our results 
when we include other covariates, choose different regression techniques and different 
subsamples. 
As a starting point, we apply the conditional difference-in-differences analysis to all 
firms and banks in our sample in order to identify a general bank-risk-induced effect on 
firms’ PDs (and other firm outcome variables, see Section 6.1). In Section 6.2, we apply 
our model in (1) to different subsets of banks and firms that may yield insights into the 
heterogeneity of the treatment effect. We investigate whether the bank-risk-induced 
effect depends on firm risk classes and whether the bank’s business model (Relationship 
Bank versus Transaction Bank) is relevant. Moreover, we also examine whether the 
bank-risk-induced effect on firms’ PDs differs between crisis years and normal times. 
6.1 Baseline Results 
Table 5 shows the baseline GLM estimations on the full sample of firms and banks from 
2000 to 2011. Specifications (A1) and (A2) show the results for our first research 
question, i.e., whether a bank-induced risk transmission effect exists from bank distress 
and bailout to customer firms. The coefficients are to be interpreted as a percentage 
change. We find that the PD of customers at rescued banks increased on average by 
10.7% after the treatment occurred than that of similar customers at control banks that 
are not bailed out. Given an average Firm PD of 9.5% (of treated firms in t-1), this 
means that the average Firm PD of treated customers increased to 10.5% – which is 
quite substantial. 
Specification (A2) estimates the probability of actual default using a FE-Probit 
regression framework. Customers at a treated bank have a 10.4% higher probability of 
actually defaulting after the treatment, which is consistent with the results found in 
specification (A1). 
Specification (A3) shows results when using Firm MaxLoan, an indicator for firm 
credibility, as dependent variable. Creditreform adds a maximum trade credit 
recommendation to most firms that are evaluated. Hence, Firm MaxLoan serves as a 
benchmark to trade creditors for how much credit could be granted to the firm. The 
regression coefficients in (A3) show that logarithmized maximum loan 
recommendations (Log Firm MaxLoan) go down on average by 11.5%. This constitutes 
a significant restriction and a potential negative multiplier effect, as most firms in the 
sample are small and also dependent on trade credit.  
 20 
 
Finally, specification (A4) estimates the treatment effect on logarithmized firm sales 
(Log Firm Sales) in order to capture effects on the real economy via affected firms. We 
find a strongly significant negative effect of a -8.55% decrease in Log Firm Sales after 
the treatment. This result supports the finding that the increases in Firm PD and 
alongside reductions in trade credit recommendations substantially affect firm 
performance. 
Table 5: Impact of Bank Distress on Firm Distress 
Specification A1 A2 A3 A4 
Estimator GLM logit link FE Probit OLS FE OLS FE 
Dependent Variable Firm PD Actual Firm 
Default 
Log Firm 
MaxLoan 
Log Firm 
Sales 
Sample all all all all 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time All Years All Years All Years All Years 
Treatment Effect 0.107*** 0.104*** -0.115*** -0.0855*** 
Observations 285,090 210,852 223,212 195,806 
Number of groups 67,972 52,091 48,405 44,763 
Conditional difference-in-differences estimates on the firm-bank-neighbor-year-level. (Robust) standard 
errors in parentheses. Specification A1 shows GLM-estimates on firms’ individual PDs. Specification A2 
shows FE-Probit results on actual firm defaults. Specification A3 uses the variable Log Firm MaxLoan in 
a FE-OLS regression. Finally, specification A4 shows a FE-OLS regression on Log Firm Sales. Variables 
are explained in Table 9 in the Appendix.  Specifications A1, A3 and A4 use robust standard errors,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
It is worthwhile to take a step back at this point and think about the channels which 
drive these findings. Firms not only suffer directly since their main banks may grant less 
credit, require more collateral or higher interest rates. They also suffer from a weaker 
position in business to business bargaining. Creditreform is the largest credit bureau in 
Germany and particularly specialized on the business to business market. Their key 
business is to provide firms with expertise that demand information on a client or 
supplier firm. Hence, a worsened credit rating and a reduction in trade credit 
recommendation may further affect a firm’s performance on both market sides: On the 
input side, because supplier firms may become more reluctant to grant trade credit to the 
firm. Moreover on the output side because firms (and customers) may hesitate to place 
orders at a supplier firm if there are substantial insolvency risks. 
Our results show that firms connected to bailed-out banks suffer. These findings are in 
contrast to the results for US TARP. Berger et al. (2017), Berger and Roman (2017) and 
Norden et al. (2013) document that TARP helped to increase credit supply and 
customers of banks that received capital through TARP benefitted. Moreover, Norden et 
al. (2018) show that corporate borrowers of TARP banks also increased their trade 
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credit supply. Compared to US TARP, banks in Germany participating in bailouts 
schemes are required to substantially restructure and deleverage assets. This burden may 
force banks to cut loans and cause adverse effects on the real economy, in particular in a 
crisis. 
We visualize our findings by plotting the outcome variables for treated and untreated 
banks around the treatment year. In order to do this, we first estimated the models and 
then removed the fixed-components ߩ௚௞,௧ෟ in (1) from the outcome variables. The 
resulting adjusted values for Firm PD, Log Firm MaxLoan and Log Firm Sales are 
shown in Figure 2 in the Appendix. We observe parallel trends for all three variables for 
the three years before the treatment and, afterwards, a visible increase in Firm PD and a 
substantial decrease in Log Firm MaxLoan and Log Firm Sales. Interestingly, we see 
differences in levels before the treatment for both variables, i.e., treated banks have, on 
average, slightly “better” (0.1 percentage points) customers before the treatment than 
control banks. After the treatment occurs, the average PD of customers at treated banks 
increases visibly above the level of control bank customers which is what the regression 
results in A1 suggest. 
6.2 Risk Pass-Through in a Crisis 
For a more detailed picture of the effects, we now turn to an analysis of different 
macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, we want to answer the question of whether 
distress-induced bank bailout events that happen during a systemic crisis affect firms 
differently than such events outside a systemic crisis featuring different transmission of 
bank distress shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. We define crisis 
treatments as treatments occurring at the peak of the financial crisis 2008 and 2009 and 
all other treatment years as non-crisis years.  
Table 6 shows the same specifications as in Table 5 but now we distinguish with respect 
to the timing of the treatment. The effects in crisis and non-crisis years are overall 
similar. While the impacts on Firm PD and Actual Firm Default differ only slightly, the 
treatment effect for Log Firm MaxLoan is only significant in crisis years with -10%. 
The differentiation for Firm Sales leaves us with insignificant coefficients for crisis and 
non-crisis years.  
Taken together, our findings show that bank distress affects firm default risk both in 
crisis and in non-crisis times, although the impact is slightly stronger in crisis years 
when it comes to trade credit recommendations and sales. 
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Table 6: Impact of Bank Distress on Firm Distress: Crisis versus Normal Times 
Panel a (Crisis)         
Specification B1a B3a B2a B4a 
Estimator GLM logit link FE Probit GLM logit link OLS FE 
Dependent Variable Firm PD Actual Firm 
Default 
Log Firm 
MaxLoan 
Log Firm 
Sales 
Sample all all all all 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Crisis Crisis Crisis Crisis 
Treatment Effect 0.102** 0.0979*** -0.100*** -0.0690 
Observations 163,843 123,135 134,638 115,494 
Number of groups 32,070 24,810 23,789 21,866 
  
Panel b (Normal 
Times) 
Specification B1b B3b B2b B4b 
Estimator GLM logit link FE Probit GLM logit link OLS FE 
Dependent Variable Firm PD Actual Firm 
Default 
Log Firm 
MaxLoan 
Log Firm 
Sales 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample all all all all 
Time No Crisis No Crisis No Crisis No Crisis 
Treatment Effect 0.110** 0.0944*** -0.141 0.00308 
Observations 12,1247 87,717 88,574 80,312 
Number of groups 35,902 27,281 24,616 22,897 
Conditional difference-in-differences estimates on the firm-bank-neighbour-year-level. (Robust) standard 
errors in parentheses Specifications B1a/b show GLM-estimates on firms’ individual PDs for treatment 
years within the crisis (2008 and 2009) in panel a and for treatment years outside the crisis (2003 – 2007) 
in panel b. Accordingly, specifications B2a/b show FE-Probit results on actual firm defaults. 
Specifications B3a/b use the variable Log Firm MaxLoan in a FE-OLS regression. Finally, specifications 
B4a/b show a FE-OLS regression on Log Firm Sales. Variables are explained in Table 9 in the 
Appendix. Specifications B1a/b, B3a/b and B4a/b use robust standard errors, 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
6.3 Relationship Banks versus Transaction Banks  
We now study whether a bank’s business model influences the previously reported 
bank-induced risk effects. In particular, we investigate whether a relationship bank 
behaves differently than a transaction bank when it enters into distress and a bailout 
program. The question of whether close bank-firm relationship shield customers against 
crises has been investigated in various studies (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 1997; 
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Relationship banks may provide liquidity insurance for 
customers (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Bolton et al., 2016), i.e., they charge higher 
rates on average but keep on lending when firms are temporarily under pressure. If, 
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however, relationship banks themselves are in distress, borrowers with high PDs could 
also be supported with further credit or eventually kept alive. 
We develop three indicators to capture a bank’s relationship orientation: (i) Single 
Relationship Customers Share, (ii) Main Bank Customers Share and (iii) Regional 
Customers Share.13 The Single Relationship Customers Share is an indicator of how 
important bank k is on average for its customers. In a similar vein, the Main Bank 
Customers Share measures the average role bank k has with regard to its customers 
even when they have multiple relationships. The third indicator of relationship 
orientation, the Regional Customers Share, considers the geographical distribution of 
borrowers and is motivated by the results on the role of distance in relationship lending. 
Shorter distances may provide the bank with more information and allow relationship 
banking to be performed (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). 
We call bank k a Relationship Bank in year t when it exceeds the 75th percentile among 
all banks in year t in at least two out of the three measures of relationship orientation.14 
By contrast, Transaction Banks are defined as banks which do not exceed the 75th 
percentile in any of the relationship orientation variables. 
We now look in more detail at how the impact of bank distress interferes with the bank 
business model, but also with customer risk classes. We consider firm risk classes, since 
we expect the impact of bank distress on Firm PD not to be linear across the bank’s risk 
portfolio. We use quantile regressions to empirically investigate the relationship, where 
we use the subset of firms which do not default. 
To apply quantile regression techniques in the context of fixed effects, we rely on a 
method introduced in Canay (2011) that tackles the problem in a two-stage regression 
framework. In the first step, we estimate a fixed effects model with all non-time-
constant regressors on the right-hand side (which equals the regression setup from (1) in 
a difference-in-differences framework) and then subtract the fixed part ߩ௚௞,௧ෟ from the 
outcome variable y (which is the variable of interest). In the second step, we estimate 
one equation for every quantile of this new variable y* with bootstrapped standard 
errors from 50 replications. In our setup, the adjusted outcome variable y* is exactly 
what we used to generate the graphs in Figure 2. 
                                                 
13 The variables are defined in Table 8 along with other bank covariates. 
14 By requiring at least two out of three conditions, we reduce the likelihood that our Relationship Bank 
indicator picks up other bank characteristics such as mainly servicing small clients, or offering a broader 
range of services. 
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Figure 3 in the Appendix shows quantile regression plots using the dependent variable 
Firm PD in all of the graphs. The plots show how large the average treatment effect is 
for differently risky customers. Separate regressions are carried out for Transaction 
Banks and Relationship Banks. As it is best practice with quantile regressions, we drop 
the lower and upper quantiles because effects are often unstable there. Note that the 
effects in Figure 3a are to be interpreted as percentage points as they now come from a 
FE-OLS-regression with Firm PD as the dependent variable. Figure 3b compares the 
quantile effects for Relationship Banks and Transaction Banks, but now showing 
percentage effects. They are calculated by dividing the percentage point effects from the 
regression by the respective mean Firm PD in that quantile. 
The average treatment effect, i.e., the impact of bank distress on firm risk, is very 
different depending on whether the firm is the customer of a relationship or transaction 
bank. This holds particular for medium to high risk customers between the 40% and 
70% quantile. At transaction banks, low-risk customers are little affected, whereas high-
risk customers face a significant increase in their PDs. The relatively largest effect can 
be seen for customers at the 60% quantile where the effect adds up to a 20% increase in 
Firm PD (see Figure 3b). At relationship-banks, the path goes almost in the opposite 
direction. While for low-risk customers below the 40% quantile, almost no effect is 
obvious, high risk customers experience significantly negative effects, i.e., decreases in 
their PD up to the 70% quantile. Hence, low-risk customers are relatively less affected 
than high-risk customers. The strongest negative effect is found right at the median 
quantile with a -20% decrease in Firm PD. 
This evidence suggests that transaction and relationship banks behave quite differently 
when they enter into distress: Transaction Banks punish bad, high-risk customers, 
probably by changing their lending policy towards them. However, good, low-risk 
customers seem to be untouched. By contrast, Relationship Banks follow a different 
strategy of shielding higher risk customers, potentially by providing even further 
liquidity or granting credit lines. 
6.4 Robustness  
We carry out various robustness checks. First, our results are robust to different 
estimators applied to the data. Table 7 shows the regression framework from 
specification A1 now using different estimators. Note that the coefficients shown in 
specifications C1 to C8 have to be interpreted as percentage point effects. We see that 
effects remain qualitatively similar no matter which estimator is used. However, 
genuine firm-fixed effects models (C3 and C4) show an underestimation of the effect. 
This finding is likely due to both the demand side (firms’ order situation, idiosyncratic 
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and market risk) and Creditreform division effects (differences in risk-assessment and 
application of new methodologies by rating agencies) that we aim to exclude by 
applying our grouping in equation (1). Moreover, columns C7 and C8 take into account 
the fact that the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, which calls for a 
truncated regression. 
Table 7: Robustness Checks for the Application of 
Different Estimators on Firm PD 
Specification Estimator Number of Observations 
Number of        
Groups 
Treatment      
Effect 
C1 OLS 285,090 0.00959*** 
C2 OLS robust 285,090 0.00959*** 
C3 Genuine FE 285,090 70,687 0.00401*** 
C4 Genuine RE 285,090 70,688 0.00434*** 
C5 Group FE 285,090 67,972     0.00653 
C6 Group RE 285,090 67,973 0.00933*** 
C7 Tobit robust 285,090 67,974 0.00930*** 
C8 GEE robust 285,090 67,975 0.00883*** 
C1 and C2 show basic OLS estimations, C3 and C4 FE-estimates on the firm-level, C5 and C6 FE and 
RE estimates on the group-level, C7 is a random effects Tobit estimation with 0 lower and 1 upper 
bound. Finally, C8 is the GEE estimator applied in our main regressions, although this time with an 
identity-link, i.e. it gives the percentage point effect for reasons of comparison to the other models. All 
models are estimated using the full sample. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Second, Table 15 in the Appendix gives evidence on whether the inclusion of bank and 
firm covariates into the regression changes the coefficient estimates on Firm PD. Again, 
the baseline specification A1 forms the basis for this table. Moving more to the bottom 
of the table, we include more and more covariates into the regression. In a well-
specified conditional difference-in-differences setup, coefficients ought to remain stable 
when including covariates from the matching equation. While firm characteristics are 
not part of the matching equation, they enter through the grouping applied in equation 
(1) and given little time variation in firm covariates, including these covariates should 
not change our coefficients on the treatment effect either. Table 15 shows this to be the 
case for the bank-covariates employed in the matching equation (compare Table 8 for 
an overview) and the firm characteristics entering into the group-fixed effect. 
Third, in Table 16 in the Appendix, we examine whether the impact of bank distress on 
Firm PD is different for different subsamples. We find that our results are robust to firm 
location and restrictions on the macroeconomic environment. Results differ to some 
extent depending on the bank type. The treatment effect is, for example, stronger if 
cooperative or savings banks are excluded. Moreover, the treatment effect also depends 
on firm age. We find that the treatment effect increases with firm age up until firms of 
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more than 50 years of age, i.e., medium to old firms are more strongly affected when 
their main bank gets into distress than younger ones. 
7 Concluding Remarks  
This paper analyses whether there is a curbing effect from distress-induced bank 
bailouts as reflected in a firm’s probability of default. Bank bailouts not only affect 
banks actions towards firms, it may also generate multiplicator effects towards other 
firm financing sources such as trade credit. 
Our empirical analysis for Germany over the period 2000-2011 shows that a distressed 
bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a 
bank-induced increase in the probability of default of about 10%, and a lowering of the 
advised maximum trade credit loan of about 11%. Furthermore, distress-induced bank 
bailouts have real effects on firm outcomes as we find an 8.5% reduction in firm sales. 
We find that the effects are somewhat stronger when the bank entered into distress 
during the global financial crisis than outside, providing some indication for different 
transmission of bank distress shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. 
Relationship and transaction banks that are in distress and bailed out generate quite 
different bank-induced risk effects. Whereas bailouts of transaction banks lead to an 
increase in the probability of defaults for firms, relationship banks seem to shield high-
risk firms from increases in the probability of default. 
While the bank recovery and resolution scheme in Germany has – during the period 
under review – contributed to stability in the banking system and its design limits the 
use of taxpayer money due to contributions from the collective protection schemes, we 
reveal a potential curbing effect on the real economy as it seems to generate negative 
effects for corporate borrowers linked to bailed out banks.  
  
 27 
 
Appendix 
Figure 1: Mean Characteristics of Banks with a Capital Injection (“Solid”) 
and Banks without (“Dashed”) Before and After Treatment 
 
 
The timeline refers to years before and after matching. Matches are obtained using nearest-neighbor-
matching on bank covariates in period t-1. The set of control banks may be constituted by the three 
nearest neighbors of bank k. Variables are explained in Table 8. 
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Figure 2: Average Adjusted Outcome Values from Regression Specifications 
A1 (“Top”), A3 (“Middle”) and A4 (“Bottom”) 
 
The figures show adjusted outcome values from the regression specifications A1, A3 and A4 
differentiated by the time before and after treatment and the treatment status. Values are adjusted by the 
respective fixed-effect estimate from the regression. This methodology leaves us with the net treatment 
effect in the matched sample conditional on the group-fixed effect. For the definition of the variables see 
Table 9. 
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Figure 3: Results of Quantile Regressions 
Firm PD as dependent variable and distinguishing upon relationship and transaction banks 
  
 
We apply a method for fixed effects in quantile regressions introduced in Canay (2011). Standard errors 
are bootstrapped with 50 replications. Plot a) contains percentage point effects and 5% confidence 
intervals. Plot b) shows the percentage point effect in relation to the respective mean Firm PD in quantile 
q, i.e. the percentage effect. White boxes/prisms show insignificant areas at the 5% level. 
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Table 8: Definition of Bank Variables 
Type of 
Information 
(Source) 
Corresponding 
CAMEL-
category (where 
applicable) 
Variable name  Variable Definition 
Treatment 
(Bundesbank’s 
Bank Distress 
Database) 
  Affected Bank Bank receives capital injection in treatment year t+1 
Bank Balance 
Sheet 
Information 
(Bundesbank’s 
prudential data 
base BAKIS and 
Bundesbank’s 
Borrowers 
Statistics) 
Bank Size GDP deflated total assets (log) 
Capital 
Adequacy (C) 
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio Tier 1 capital over total assets (%) 
Reserves Ratio 
Bank reserves (pursuant to section 340 
f/g of the German Commercial Code) 
over total assets (%) 
 
Asset             
Quality (A) 
NPL Ratio  Non-performing loans over total assets (%) 
Loan Portfolio HHI 
Hirschman Herfindahl Index (based on 
23 business sectors in the loan 
portfolio) 
OBS Ratio Off-balance sheet activities over total assets (%) 
Share of Customer 
Loans Customer loans over total loans (%) 
LLP Ratio Loan loss provisions over total assets (%) 
Management 
Skills (M) CIR  Cost-to-income ratio (%) 
Earnings (E) RoE Return (raw result) on equity (%) 
Liquidity (L) Cash Holdings Ratio Cash holdings over total assets (%) 
Aggregate Bank 
Customer 
Information 
(ZEW’s 
Mannheim 
Enterprise 
Panel, MUP) 
 Bank Customers 
Number of corporate customers of 
bank k (log) 
Asset             
Quality (A) 
Share of Distressed 
Customers 
Number of distressed corporate 
customers over total number of 
corporate customers (%) 
 
Share of Single 
Relationship 
Customers 
Number of corporate customers of 
bank k (having a relationship with 
bank k only) over all corporate 
customers of bank k, including 
multiple-relationship firms (%) 
 
Share of Main 
Bank Customers 
Number of corporate customers of 
bank k (using bank k as main bank) 
over total number of corporate 
customers of bank k, including 
multiple-relationship customers (%) 
 
Share of Regional 
Customers 
Number of corporate customers within 
a range of 50km of bank k over total 
number of corporate customers of bank 
k (%) 
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Table 9: Definition of Firm Variables 
Firm Age Firm age in years 
Employees Number of full-time equivalent employees 
(Log) Firm Sales (Log of) Firm sales (1,000 Euros) 
Firm PD Firm probability of default (%, over one year) evaluated by Creditreform 
Actual Firm Default Actual firm default 
Main Bank Dummy indicating whether bank is firm‘s main bank relationship 
Bank Relationships Number of bank relationships 
Single Relationship Firm  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm has only one 
Distance Firm-Bank Distance between firm and its main bank (km) 
(Log) Firm MaxLoan (Log of) Recommendation for maximum trade credit exposure to firm; recommendation provided by Creditreform (1,000 Euros) 
 
Table 10: Legal Forms 
No. Industry Sector Groups Observations Percent 
1 Liberal Profession 12,008 4.2% 
2 Commercial Operation ("Gewerbebetrieb") 144,657 50.7% 
3 BGB-Company ("BGB Gesellschaft") 10,545 3.7% 
4 Partnership ("Arbeitsgemeinschaft") 10 0.0% 
5 One-Man Business ("Einzelfirma) 13,358 4.7% 
6 General Partnership ("OHG") 791 0.3% 
7 Limited Partnership ("KG") 1199 0.4% 
8 Limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner ("GmbH & Co. KG") 6,819 2.4% 
9 Limited Liability Company ("GmbH") 91,831 32.2% 
10 Corporation ("AG") 112 0.0% 
11 Registered Co-Operative ("eG") 1,028 0.4% 
12 Registered Association ("eV") 2,732 1.0% 
  Total 285,090 100% 
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Table 11: Industry Definition and Distribution According to NACE Classification 
No. Industry Sector Groups Observations Percent 
Industry sector 
classification              
(NACE rev. 2) 
1 
Cutting-edge 
technology 
manufacturing 
956 0.34% 
20.2, 21, 24.46, 25.4, 26.11, 
26.2, 26.3, 26.4, 26.51, 26.6, 
26.7, 30.3, 30.4 
2 High-technology manufacturing 3,537 1.24% 
20.13, 20.14, 20.16, 20.42, 
20.51, 20.53, 20.59, 22.11, 
23.19, 23.44, 26.12, 27.11, 
27.12, 27.2, 27.31, 27.33, 
27.4, 27.9, 28.11, 28.12, 
28.13, 28.15, 28.23, 28.24, 
28.29, 28.3, 28.41, 28.49, 
28.92, 28.93, 28.94, 28.99, 
29.1, 29.31, 29.32, 30.2, 
33.2 
3 Non-high-tech manufacturing 19,239 6.75% 
10-33                    
(excl. sectors 1 and 2) 
4 Technology-intensive services 12,037 4.22% 
61.1-61.3, 62, 63.1,         
71.1, 71.2, 72.1 
5 Non-technical consulting services 11,319 3.97% 69, 70.2, 72.2, 73 
6 Other business-oriented services 17,285 6.06% 
61-63, 69-72, 77.1, 77.3, 
77.4, 78, 80, 81            
(ex 70.1, 74.2) 
7 Consumer-oriented services 63,436 22.25% 
55-56, 58-60, 68, 74.2, 75, 
77.2, 79, 85.5-85.6, 86-88, 
90-93, 95-96 
8 Energy/Mining/Disposal 2,007 0.70% 5-9, 35-39 
9 Construction 47,955 16.82% 41-43 
10 Trade 80,490 28.23% 49-52 
11/12 Traffic/Mailing 11,170 3.92% 49-53 
13 Banks/ Insurances/ Financial Services Excluded from Firm Sample 
64 (excl. 64.2),             
65, 66, 67 
14 Holdings 7,784 2.73% 70.1, 64.2 
0 Other (e.g. Forestry/ Agriculture) 6,983 2.45% < 10 
Total 285,090 100% 
Source: The authors’ classification, NIW/ISI/ZEW Listen 2012 (Gehrke et al., 2013). 
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Table 12: Size Classes 
Size Class Observations Percent 
Unknown 72,933 25.4% 
Sole proprietor 66,029 23.5% 
2 - 5 91,024 31.8% 
6 - 14 35,593 12.3% 
15 - 49 15,800 5.5% 
50 - 99 2,140 0.8% 
100 - 249 1,104 0.4% 
250+ 467 0.2% 
Total 285,090 100% 
 
Table 13: Age Classes 
Age Class Observations Percent 
Younger than 8 61,341 21.0% 
8 91,710 32.4% 
16 66,658 23.8% 
26 65,381 22.7% 
Total 285,090 100% 
 
Table 14: Firm Locations 
No. Industry Sector Groups Observations Percent 
1 Schleswig-Holstein 33,084 11.6% 
2 Hamburg 2,159 0.8% 
3 Niedersachsen 3,655 1.3% 
4 Bremen 170 0.1% 
5 Nordrhein-Westfalen 77,511 27.2% 
6 Hessen 46,271 16.2% 
7 Rheinland-Pfalz 26,570 9.3% 
8 Baden-Württemberg 33,935 11.9% 
9 Bayern 26,814 9.4% 
10 Saarland 65 0.0% 
11 Berlin 3,920 1.4% 
12 Brandenburg 7,890 2.8% 
13 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 7,046 2.5% 
14 Sachsen 8,994 3.2% 
15 Sachsen-Anhalt 1,651 0.6% 
16 Thüringen 5,355 1.9% 
Total 285,090 100% 
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